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AVIATION LAW-AIR SERVICES AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM*
The bilateral agreement is the primary instrument for formulating avia-
tion law between the United States and other countries.' Because the
original Bermuda Agreement was considered the model for most United
States aviation pacts,2 the renunciation of that agreement by Britain on
June 22, 19763 was a particularly important development in international
aviation. The British entered negotiations for a new agreement with the
primary purpose of securing a better share of the aviation market., The
United States, on the other hand, was seeking to uphold the principles of
the original Bermuda Agreement by stressing competition.5 The outcome
of the negotiations was the signing of a new agreement, now known as
Bermuda II. Air Services Agreement, July 23, 1977, United States-United
Kingdom, - U.S.T. - , T.I.A.S. No. 8641.
The British renunciation of the original Bermuda Agreement was appar-
ently prompted by a Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) decision in March
1976 to disapprove any additional capacity rationalization pacts' between
* The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Mr. Roy B. Cooper, Director Eco-
nomic Development and Research, Atlanta Chamber of Commerce, in locating sources.
I These agreements are Executive Agreements and are not, therefore, subject to the ap-
proval of Congress as treaties are. United States International Aviation Negotiations, Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on 'Public Works and
Transportation, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 153-54 (1978) (testimony of Joel W. Biller) [hereinafter
cited as Int'l Aviation Hearings]. This status is being challenged by the' Aviation Consumer
Action Project, a Ralph Nader organization, on constitutional grounds calling for the Senate
to ratify all such agreements as treaties. Id. at 347 (testimony of Reuben B. Robertson I).
See also Ellingsworth, Bermuda Pact Sparks Opposition, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Aug. 1,
1977, at 26. This could have a very serious impact on international air service because all such
agreements would have to be ratified, and the Senate tends to move slowly on ratification of
treaties. Another problem is lobbying by special interests once the agreement is sent to the
Senate. Id. at 27. The Aviation Consumer Action Project has raised other legal issues as well.
Int'l Aviation Hearings supra at 346-48 (testimony of Reuben B. Robertson). For a discussion
of antitrust implications see Id. at 319-22 (testimony of John W. Barnum).
I See, e.g., Diamond, The Bermuda Agreement Revisited: A Look at the Past, Present and
Future of Bilateral Air Transport Agreements, 41 J. AnI L. 419, 442 (1975).
Int'l Aviation Hearings supra note 1, at 6 (statement of Alan S. Boyd).
The British insisted on this position even though in recent years the balance of earnings
has been more equal. Ellingsworth, Special Panel to Study Bermuda, Av. WEEK & SPACE
TECH., July 5, 1976, at 29, 31.
1 Doty, White Paper Confirms Gap on Bilateral, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Jan. 3, 1977,
at 26. See also Int'l Aviation Hearings note 1 supra, at 8, 20 (statement of Alan S. Boyd).
I A capacity rationalization pact is an informal agreement between airlines to avoid over-
competition on specific routes. The Perils of No Policy on International Aviation, Bus. WEEK,
Aug. 16, 1976, at 104 [hereinafter cited as Perils]. Other factors may have been the CAB's
last minute rejection of fare increases, chastising language in an earlier capacity agreement
concerning the Miami-London route, and failure to reach capacity agreements with Pan Am
and TWA. Ellingsworth, supra note 4, at 29. It is the negotiator's opinion that the last minute
fare rejections were the primary reason for the British action. Int'l Aviation Hearings supra
note 1, at 86 (testimony of Alan S. Boyd).
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airlines, which the British had requested. Specifically, the British wanted
cutbacks of fifth freedom rights,7 rigid capacity controls,' single carrier
designation for each route,9 and an exchange of traffic statistics. 0 Further-
more, Britain made it clear that fifty percent of the traffic moving between
the United States and Great Britain should belong to British Airways" and
that steps should be taken to ensure them that much of the market.
Finally, the British believed that air fares should conform more closely to
the higher European tariffs rather than the lower CAB standards. 3
The United States position on international aviation policy was embod-
ied in a statement issued by President Ford on September 8, 1976." This
statement was adopted by the Carter administration for the purpose of
negotiating Bermuda 1I.1 Points of the statement directly corresponding
to British demands indicate that the United States will no longer consider
multi-carrier designation as vital to a successful competitive system, but
that it will continue to support the original Bermuda Agreement principles
on capacity which allow control by carriers with only ex post facto review
I Doty, supra note 5. Int'l Aviation Hearings supra note 1, at 18 (statement of Alan S.
Boyd). A fifth freedom right is the right to pick up traffic in a foreign country and carry it to
a point in another foreign country. Crucial disagreement in the original Bermuda negotiations
occurred over regulation of fifth freedom rights and not the actual granting of these rights
because some are essential, Diamond, supra note 2, at 441-42. British and European carriers
fly minimal traffic beyond the United States and are therefore particularly concerned with
limiting these rights. Doty, British Action Forces Bermuda Review, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH.,
Oct. 18, 1976, at 51. Britain contends that Bermuda allows the United States to carry most
of North Atlantic traffic through a superior route system with higher flight frequency; there-
fore, it should receive 50% of the traffic instead of the current 42%. Closing the Gaps in Air-
Service Talks, Bus. WEEK, May 9, 1977, at 32. In 1976 the United States carriers had $375
million in revenue, British Airways $274 million; on the fifth freedom routes (out of London)
United States carriers made $170 million and British Airways only $8.5 million.
I Capacity controls are controls over the number of seats or amount of cargo space available
on a specific route within a given period of time. One means of controlling capacity is through
restrictions on flight frequency. One reason for controlling capacity is that overcapacity leads
to low fares and rates. Another is that unfilled seats and cargo space means waste, inefficiency
and operating losses. The Bermuda Parallelogram, EcONOMIST, June 4, 1977, at 98. Britain
was particularly concerned with the waste of fuel during the fuel shortage. Reed,
Transatlantic Flight Paths Cleared in Dawn Deal, THE Tim (London) June 23, 1977, at 23,
col. 4.
1 Single carrier designation allows only one airline from each country to operate a specific
route as opposed to multicarrier designation which allows competition between the airlines
of each country on that route. Int'l Aviation Hearings supra note 1, at 18 (statement of Alan
S. Boyd).
10 Doty, supra note 5, at 26.
Int'l Aviation Hearings supra note 1, at 17 (statement of Alan S. Boyd).
I Id. See also Bluff and Counter-Bluff Across North Atlantic, ECONOMIsT, June 18, 1977,
at 94.
13 The Bermuda Parallelogram, supra note 8.
'1 New International Aviation Policy Will Be Released Today, Av. DAILY, Sept. 8, 1976, at
33 [hereinafter cited as Release].
11 US. Eases Its Position on Multiple Designation, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., March 7,
1977, 28 [hereinafter cited as U.S. Eases Position].
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by government, and that bilateral review will be sought where sixth free-
dom" capacity is heavily relied upon." Although the statement did not
directly address the question of fifth freedom rights, the United States
position was to maintain the status quo, with minor concessions.' The
statement left room for the negotiation of capacity agreements where ex-
cess capacity was affecting the viability of markets, if the public interest
was served, other alternatives proved infeasible, and the restrictions were
temporary and approved and monitored by the CAB." As to fares and
rates, the statement provided that the United States would continue to
accept the International Air Transport Association (IATA) system for ne-
gotiation of scheduled tariffs and called for cost-related fares at the lowest
possible levels permitting a reasonable return. It also urged prompt action
by the CAB on IATA proposals.'"
The United States policy statement also contained other provisions more
domestic in scope, including urging the consideration of different carriers
to serve a single foreign destination from different American points, plac-
ing less emphasis on traditional gateways and more emphasis on opening
new coterminal points, recognizing area competition in choosing carriers,
and extending the domestic route system.' A basic general consideration
was the commercial viability of a route and its impact on the current
international route system."
Another component in the United States position was the role of the
1, Sixth freedom rights are a variation of fifth freedom rights and involve picking up traffic
in one foreign country, carrying it through the flag country and to another foreign country.
"7 New International Aviation Policy Statements: A Preview, Av. DAILY, Sept. 3, 1976, at
22-24, citing a draft statement [hereinafter cited as Draft Statement]. The content of this
statement was not substantially different from the later statement, Release, supra note 5.
IA US. Eases Position, supra note 16. See also Int'l Aviation Hearings note 1 supra, at 8
(statement of Alan S. Boyd).
" Draft Statement, supra note 17, at 23. The CAB is an independent regulatory commis-
sion responsible for the promotion and regulation of the civil air transport industry through
approval or disapproval of proposed routes involving international routes. Their decisions are
subject to the approval of the President, 49 U.S.C. § 1461 (1970).
" Draft Statement, supra note 17, at 24. The International Air Transport Association
(IATA) is a voluntary, non-exclusive organization composed of most of the world's major
international carriers. Its purposes are to promote safe, regular, and economical air transport;
to foster air commerce and study problems connected with it; and to provide a means of
collaboration among air transport enterprises either directly or indirectly involved in interna-
tional air transport service. The IATA establishes fares in the first instance but every nation
must approve the fares as reasonable. All decisions of the IATA must be unanimous. Edles,
IA TA, The Bilaterals and International Aviation Policy, 27 FED. B. J. 291, 292-93 (1967). The
CAB's failure to act as promptly as provided in Bermuda I has caused a measure of complaint
in the past from other countries. The British in particular have complained because the CAB
waits until the last minute to express approval or disapproval of fare proposals. Perils, supra
note 6. See also Int'l Aviation Hearings note 1 supra, at 7 n. 4, 5 (statement of Alan S. Boyd).
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CAB, which assists the State Department in the negotiation of interna-
tional agreements. 3 The CAB's role was highlighted by the Transatlantic
Route Proceeding, which involved a comprehensive review of United
States air service over transatlantic routes." This review encompassed
consideration of United States-United Kingdom air routes and focused
on such factors as the survival and strengthening of Pan Am and TWA,
the potential contribution to the United States balance of payments, effec-
tive service, the strengthening of the United States position in light of
increased foreign competition, and the relationship between city-pair
designations and the overall United States-European market.25 A specific
issue considered by the CAB was the designation of new coterminal points.
The CAB recognized the possibility of foreign governments demanding
concessions in return for new gateways and, therefore, selected only those
cities which it felt could support nonstop service immediately, within the
foreseeable future, or which provided benefits not otherwise attainable."
The Bermuda II pact was marked by considerable compromise. Not-
withstanding the British position on capacity controls, the agreement basi-
cally reiterates the original Bermuda Agreement's principle of competi-
" 14 C.F.R. § 384 (1977).
u CAB Decision, Transatlantic Route Proceeding, Docket No. 25908 (July 21, 1976) 1
[hereinafter cited as CAB Decision]. The proceeding involved renewal of scheduled passen-
ger service, new coterminal points, renewal of supplementary authority, and the possibility
of scheduled supplementary service, renewal of existing cargo service, possible expansion of
the route map, and the possibility of cargo transport on supplementary carriers. The proceed-
ing was initiated by CAB Order 73-9-83 (Sept. 21, 1973), which was amended (Nov. 21, 1973);
Judge Newmann issued a recommended decision (Jan. 17, 1975). President Ford disapproved
that decision on December 24, 1976. Ellingsworth, Ford Overturns Atlantic Decision, Av.
WEE & SPACE TECH. Jan. 3, 1977, at 25. The Board held further hearings in the summer of
1977 and met in September to make a decision. The CAB submitted its decision to the
President on Oct. 21, 1977. The President approved the CAB decision with two revisions on
December 21, 1977, and the CAB approved those changes on January 11, 1978. CAB OKs
Atlanta-London Route, Atlanta Constitution, Jan. 12, 1978, § C, at 13, col. 4. The President
signed the order implementing the decision on Jan. 27, 1978. President Signs Revised Air
Package For Expanded U.S.-Europe Service, Wash. Post, § F, at 11, col. 4. All citations to
the decision are to the July 21 opinion. The new decision incorporates changes necessary to
the implementation of Bermuda II and President Carter's two revisions but is otherwise
materially the same. CAB Decision, Transatlantic Route Proceeding, Docket No. 25908 (Jan.
11, 1978) 1.
1 CAB Decision, supra note 24, at 8, 11-12. See generally, Note, A New Era in International
Aviation: CAB Regulation, Rationalization and Restrictionism on North Atlantic, 7 N.Y.U.
J. INT'L L. & POL. 317 (1974). This Note also poses some arguments regarding capacity
controls and fare regulation. See notes 54-59 infra and accompanying text. See also Recom-
mended Decision, Newmann, J., Transatlantic Route Proceeding, Docket No. 25908. (Jan.
17, 1975) 12-13 [hereinafter cited as Newmann Decision].
n CAB Decision, supra note 24, at 31. CAB recommended Houston, Dallas/Ft. Worth,
Cleveland, Pittsburgh, Atlanta, St. Louis, Denver, Kansas City, Tampa, New Orleans, and
Minneapolis/St. Paul. Id. at 3. Insofar as these choices are inconsistent with Bermuda II they
will have to be changed. 49 U.S.C. § 1502 (1970).
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tion, as supported by the United States." In particular Bermuda II pro-
vides for adequate capacity to meet traffic demands, consideration of effi-
ciency of operations, and consultations when either party believes the prin-
ciples have been violated. The agreement also delineates three factors
which should be considered in relation to capacity: traffic requirements of
the countries at either end of a route, "through" airline operation require-
ments, and the traffic requirements of intermediate areas after taking into
account local and regional services.2 8 There are, however, some restrictions
on flight frequency on routes involving Japan-Hong Kong, Thailand, and
Singapore. 9 Also, route schedules must be submitted for inspection by the
other country, and agreement must be reached. 30 Furthermore, the com-
promise established that only one carrier would be permitted per gateway,
unless traffic exceeds certain limits, or the other party fails to designate a
carrier within three years. Each country may, however, designate two gate-
ways to be serviced by two carriers.31 There were no such limitations on
carrier designation in the original Bermuda Agreement.22
Bermuda II includes very significant changes in fifth freedom rights. The
United States gave up fifth freedom rights to 22 cities not currently being
served.3 3 In addition, the United States may serve Austria and Belgium for
only three more years and Holland, Norway, and Sweden for five more
years. After those periods end, the United States will have fifth freedom
rights only to Frankfurt, Hamburg, Munich, and Berlin from London and
Prestwick/Glasgow. Other points are included on around the world combi-
nation routes, in all-cargo service, and from Bermuda."4 Britain has fifth
freedom rights to points in Central and South America, Japan, and Mexico
City, in both passenger and cargo flights. 35 Vancouver is a fifth freedom
right point on the Hong Kong-United States route. 6 These limitations on
fifth freedom rights are offset in part by provisions allowing both countries
V Lowenfeld, High Stakes in a New Air Pact, N.Y. Times, July 3, 1977, § F, at 1, col. 1.
See also Int'l Aviation Hearings note 1 supra, at 51-2 (statement of Alan S. Boyd).
Air Services Agreement, July 23, 1977, United States-United Kingdom, arts. 11, 12-14,
- U.S.T. - , T.I.A.S. No. 8641 [hereinafter cited as Bermuda I].
" Id. at Annex 1, 24, 38. The figures for flights allowed per week are: 14 round trip combina-
tion Japan-Hong Kong; 7 Thailand & Singapore; 7 Japan by United Kingdom.
" Id. at Annex 2. In the absence of agreement a formula is used. Each airline may operate
on a proposed schedule not to exceed the total round trip frequencies allowed during the
previous corresponding seasons plus the average forecast percentage applied to those frequen-
cies, i.e., the previous frequency plus an additional number based on a mean projected
percentage of increased traffic.
31 Id., art. 3(2)(a)(b).
2 Air Services Agreement, Feb. 11, 1946, United States-United Kingdom, 60 Stat. 1499,
T.I.A.S. No. 1507 [hereinafter cited as Bermuda I].
3 Brown, Compromise Marks Bilateral Pact, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., June 27, 1977, at
26.
3, Bermuda 11, supra note 28, Annex 1, § 1 (United States routes).
Id. Annex 1, § 3, (United Kingdom routes) 3-5, 10-12.
Id. Annex 1, § 3, (United Kingdom route 6).
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to carry unlimited transit and on-line traffic."
Bermuda II also provides for certificates of airworthiness, consultations
on safety and security, conformance to the standards of the other party,
and maximum cooperation in matters of security. Portions of the agree-
ment relating to certificates are identical to the provisions of the original
agreement, but those promoting safety and security are new." Provision is
also made for the exemption of equipment, fuel, spare parts, and aircraft
stores from custom duties, excise taxes, and other charges when they are
on board the aircraft. This exemption also applies to an extent when they
are taken on board in the country of the other party. The exemption pre-
viously applied only to supplies retained on board; supplies taken on board
were subject to charges not less favorable than those granted to the most
favored nation.39
The new agreement also provides that tariffs be established at the lowest
level consistent with safety and an adequate profit. Where the tariffs result
from intercarrier discussion, they are subject to the approval of the aeron-
autical authorities. Such approval is necessary even where they arise under
the procedures of IATA. Procedural requirements as to timing of proposals
have changed, but the basic structure is the same as in the original agree-
ment. 0 Bermuda II provides for dispute settlement to be handled first by
a round of formal consultation and then submitted to some person or body
chosen by agreement. If no agreement can be reached, the dispute will be
referred to a three member arbitration tribunal. The original Bermuda
Agreement had provided for consultation and then submission to the In-
terim Council of the Provisional International Civil Aviation Organiza-
tion."
The CAB decision of July 21, 1976 provided for new coterminals at
eleven cities. 2 The Bermuda II agreement, however, provides for new cot-
erminals only at Atlanta, Houston, Dallas/Ft. Worth, and an additional
point to be agreed upon by the parties. 3 All of these points will receive
V Id. Annex 1, § 5. Flag carriers of either country carrying passengers originating in their
own territory may carry these passengers through designated coterminals to other points,
whether they remain on the same flight or transfer to another flight of the same airline. Limits
on fifth freedom rights apply only to picking up traffic in the coterminal to carry to other
points. See also Int'l Aviation Hearings note 1 supra, at 29-32 (statement of Alan S. Boyd).
Id. art. 6, 7; Bermuda I, supra note 32, art. 4.
3' Bermuda II, supra note 28, art. 9; Bermuda I, supra note 32, art. 3.
,0 Bermuda II, supra note 28, art. 12; Bermuda I, supra note 32, Annex II.
11 Bermuda ]I, supra note 28, art. 17; Bermuda I, supra note 9, art. 9.
42 See note 26 supra.
'3 Bermuda II, supra note 28, at Annex 1, § 1 (United States route 1). These routes,
however, were stressed by the CAB and another point can be added, and presumably it will
be chosen from the other cities suggested. The CAB's consideration of possible requests for
reciprocity or other concessions may have foreseen the possibility of routes being limited;
thus, they may have asked more than expected. Because the three points are all in the
Southern region the CAB concern for serving these markets can be satisfied. CAB Decision,
supra note 24, at 31, 35.
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reciprocal authority eventually, but from the additional point and Houston
to London, and from London to Atlanta and Dallas/Ft. Worth, nonstop
service is delayed three years." Britain also gets new entries into the
United States at San Francisco and Seattle. 5
One initial criticism of the agreement from the American point of view
addressed the number of gateways the British gained into the United
States versus only one major gateway in the United Kingdom for the
United States. Other criticisms centered on the limits on flights in the
Pacific arena and lost fifth freedom rights. The first area of criticism may
be valid, but it should be noted that each route does have reciprocity which
allows American carriers to fly to Britain," and there are other points in
the British Commonwealth open to the United States. The second area,
limited flights in the Pacific, is of concern primarily because of the need
for these routes in around the world service.'" The third area, lost fifth
freedom rights, is probably the most serious in its effect on the amount of
traffic United States carriers will handle in Europe, even though the
United States did retain fifth freedom rights for around the world service
and for the major German cities. Also, although fifth freedom rights to
Austria, Belgium, Norway, Sweden and The Netherlands will be phased
out, carrier officials are not too concerned, because nonstop service to these
points is likely in the near future. American carrier officials are concerned,
however, because of the comparatively larger number of fifth freedom
rights granted to Britain-South America, Mexico City-and because all
points in Canada are intermediate points to the United States.48
This concern over fifth freedom losses was echoed by CAB Chairman
Kahn in his statement before the House Subcommittee on Aviation. He
stated that one goal of international aviation negotiations should be maxi-
mum flexibility in fifth and sixth freedom rights; however, the only specific
area he mentioned was the possible impact of fifth freedom restrictions on
all-cargo flights involving Hong Kong."
Chairman Kahn also expressed concern over the limitations on carrier
designation and capacity restrictions, since restrictions in these two areas
may interfere with competitive development of the market.k In his opin-
44 Bermuda II, supra note 28, Annex 1, § 1, (United States route 1), § 3 (United Kingdom
route 1). Other points involved are Prestwick/Glasgow, Manchester (Britain to United States
only), Bermuda and the Caribbean.
,1 Britain Wins, Travellers Lose, ECONOMIST, June 25, 1977, at 90 [hereinafter cited as
Britain Wins]. See also Int'l Aviation Hearings note 1 supra, at 34 (statement of Alan S.
Boyd).
U Lowenfeld, supra note 27, col. 5-6. For a general analysis of Bermuda II see Int'l Aviation
Hearings supra note 1, at 304-15 (statement of John W. Barnum).
,7 Pact Seen Dangerous Precedent, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., July 18, 1977, at 25.
,5 Id. See also Int'l Aviation Hearings supra note 1, at 191 (testimony of J. J. O'Connell).
Int'l Aviation Hearings supra note 1, at 102 (testimony of Alfred E. Kahn).
10 Id. The British were back to negotiate restrictions on flights within a few weeks of
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ion, encouraging competitive development is necessary in order to serve
the public interest in more efficient, responsive, and inexpensive air serv-
ice;' any restrictions would sacrifice these long-term goals for the protec-
tion of short-term carrier profits.52 As mentioned earlier, the United States
policy in the negotiations was that multi-carrier designation would not be
considered essential for a competitive system, 53 a position in direct conflict
with Kahn's statement. The United States policy statement allowed for
some limited capacity controls, and the Bermuda II Agreement may very
well have imposed more restric-tions-than contemplated, but capacity is
still a subject of negotiation and agreement.
The issue of capacity has been the subject of much discussion in recent
years. The United States stance against controls has been heavily criti-
cized. In fact, as early as 1974 officials within the State Department, the
Department of Transportation, and the airline industry were admitting
that the original Bermuda Agreement position on capacity was becoming
weaker and less defensible because of intense competition, high costs, and
economic problems.54 Various writers have suggested a change in the policy
approach of the United States in light of the diminished share of the
market American planes carry, the overall decline in air traffic,55 and the
lack of any real control of fares by the current system. 5
One specialist in international aviation law, Andreas Lowenfeld, sug-
gests a reversal of our stands on capacity and fare regulation and argues
for the reasonable allocation of resources through negotiation of restraints
on capacity. He suggests three steps: (1) setting target load factors, (2)
estimating consumption (number of passengers per day) and setting the
number of spaces to offer accordingly, and (3) negotiating the share of
capacity, as well as provisions for regular adjustment in capacity as situa-
tions change or more accurate information is acquired. 51 Complementing
this structure a relaxation of fare control is recommended along with the
adoption of a target price range which would allow freedom to vary extras.
signing Bermuda H. Id. But see Int'lAviation Hearings, note 1 supra, at 74, 83-84 (testimony
of Alan S. Boyd).
5' Id. at 100.
52 Id. at 100-01.
Draft Statement, supra note 17.
Heightened Competition Sparks Turn from Bermuda Principles, Av. WEEK & SPACE
TECH., Aug. 5, 1974, at 29.
u Diamond, supra note 2, at 477. In 1946 the United States generated 70% of traffic and
carried 80%. Now, fifth freedom principles expose the United States market to competition
from dozens of foreign carriers, many of which generate little traffic, so that now the United
States airlines carry about 40% of the traffic while generating 71% of it.
16 Lowenfeld, A New Takeoff for International Air Transport, 54 FOR. AFF. 36, at 45. See
also, Edles, supra note 20, at 303-06.
Lowenfeld, supra note 56, at 46-47.
Id. at 49. See also, Jordan, Airline Capacity Agreements Correcting a Regulatory
Imperfection, 39 J. AIR L. & COM. 179 (1973), for a discussion of reasons to encourage the
relaxation of the controls.
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Another commentator suggests that an equitable exchange of economic
benefits can be obtained in negotiating new agreements by determining:
(1) the type of traffic to include in evaluating the market potential of a
route, (2) the proportion of the market to attribute to each country, (3) the
number of passengers or tons of cargo attributable to each, and (4) poten-
tial revenues.5
9
A final criticism of Chairman Kahn was the failure to reach an agree-
ment on charter competition, which was left to further negotiation. In his
opinion any restriction on charters would endanger their survival and,
therefore, endanger the future of the low-cost service they provide. His
concern was prompted because the memorandum on this subject, which
is in effect until a new agreement is reached, puts more restrictive condi-
tions on charters than the CAB does.60
There has been much less criticism of the new agreement from British
sources. The Secretary of State for Trade termed the agreement reasonable
and satisfactory for both sides and predicted that the agreement would
result in more opportunity for British airlines, less waste of resources, and
real advantages to air travellers. Furthermore, he said that the capacity
control mechanisms would lead to lower fares in real terms."9 Other com-
mentators, however, have suggested that although the British taxpayer
would win-the state-owned British Airways would probably obtain a
larger portion of the market-the passengers would lose because of less
competitive service."2 Another criticism, from British Caledonian, Britain's
major private carrier, focused on provisions which undermined that air-
line's competitive position, and which placed Britain in a generally inferior
position in terms of market share opportunity. 3 The overall British view-
point, however, seems to be that the United Kingdom received most of
what it had sought, particularly because of the capacity controls won.
Although the outcome of negotiations in Bermuda II seems to be a fairly
rational compromise in light of the long negotiations and differences in
position, the real test will be whether it achieves either a solution to United
States difficulties or the goals of the British. Hopefully, it will at least
partially fulfill the needs of both countries.
Because of the recent economic difficulties of American international
carriers and generally poor market conditions it seems that a new approach
" Diamond, supra note 2, at 433 quoting from THE FREEDOM OF THE AIR 180-89 (E. McWhin-
ney & M. Bradley, eds. (1968)).
" Int'l Aviation Hearings, supra note 1, at 102 (testimony of Alfred E. Kahn). For an
explanation of the charter issue see id. at 16, 17 n. 11 (statement of Alan S. Boyd) and id. at
70, 76 (testimony of Alan S. Boyd). But see id. at 231-52 (testimony of Edward J. Driscoll).
" Reed, U.S. Views Air Pact with Britain as Victory For All, THE TIMES (London), June
23, 1977, at 1, col. 6.
" Britain Wins, supra note 45.
'3 Reed, Airline Sees Pact On Atlantic as Unfair, THE TIMES (London), June 24, 1977, at
7, col. 8. No reasons for that feeling were given.
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may be appropriate. Lowenfeld's suggestions for changes in the United
States position seem to be realistic, flexible, and direct. To the extent that
the capacity clauses are indeed sufficient and can become operational,
Lowenfeld's approach has been partially implemented. But in the area of
fares, which are still to be set with approval of IATA, Lowenfeld's comple-
mentary structure cannot be realized, and the control of both capacity and
fares may not be desirable. However, it is too late for the United States to
take a freer approach on fare regulation."4
For the United States, it is also important to consider the relationship
between its aviation policy and the various executive agencies and the
CAB. President Ford, the Justice Department, and former CAB Chairman
Robson, were all concerned about the changing desires of other govern-
ments.'5 In its response to President Ford's disapproval of the recom-
mended decision, the CAB emphasized that the Departments of State,
Justice, and Transportation had previously chosen not to participate in the
hearings and requested that those departments be involved in future con-
siderations of the case." This response indicates the need for more coopera-
tion among the United States government agencies involved in order to
alleviate the difficulty in haphazardly considering foreign policy argu-
ments. Such cooperation is particularly important for the development of
a uniform position in future negotiations." In order to fulfill its responsibil-
ities in the development of policy, the CAB has redefined the mission of
" There are indications that the Carter administration is considering the adoption of a new
very pro-competitive aviation policy and taking a somewhat harsher position in the negotia-
tion process. U.S. Readies Stiffer International Policy, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Sept. 12,
1977, at 29. Any new policy is significant, but when there are substantial changes the signifi-
cance is greater. The policy may also increase the role of the President in negotiations. Id.
Another difference in the policy of the Carter administration is the increased emphasis on
low-fare innovation and charter air services. Int'l Aviation Hearings supra note 1, at 177
(testimony of Joel W. Biller).
Lowenfeld, Commentary: The Air Rules Need a Change, N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1976, § F,
at 2, col. 5. The negotiation of Bermuda II has policy implications reaching beyond American-
British relations. Both Japan and Italy have elected to open negotiations of their agreements
with the United States. Doty, Japan Joins Bermuda Principles Attack, Av. WEEK & SPACE
TECH., Aug. 23, 1976, at 24. The pact will undoubtedly serve as a model for other bilateral
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23 (1977). But see Int'l Aviation Hearings, note 1 supra, at 137, 149-50 (testimony of Chester
C. Davenport and Joel W. Biller). Canada, Mexico and others have also started negotiations.
Kahn statement, supra note 49, at 8. Id. at 99 (testimony of Alfred E. Kahn).
" CAB Order 77-4-118, Transatlantic Route Proceeding, Docket No, 25908 at 4 (Apr. 25,
1977).
" Chairman Kahn was also concerned about the lack of uniformity in position among
agencies and the role of the CAB in providing guidance to the Department of State. Int'l
Aviation Hearings, supra note 1, at 107 (testimony of Alfred E. Kahn). But see id. at 11, 22,
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tions and formulation of policy. He indicates agreement has been reached among these
agencies for negotiations with the Japanese. Id. at 105.
1978] RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 221
the Bureau of International Aviation to develop policy options that have a
solid factual, analytical, and legal basis, and has appointed a new director
who believes in the development of a more competitive system." One
means of achieving uniformity would be through a permanent Cabinet
level Council, which would coordinate international air policy, establish
specific objectives, and perhaps actively search for those countries offering
the most promising opportunities. 9 Whatever the future course of interna-
tional aviation agreements, the provisions of Bermuda II should be re-
garded as a partial step in the direction of the revitalization of interna-
tional air transport for both the airlines and passengers.
Patricia E. Cooper
Id. at 107.
" Id. at 108.

